

NEWS ANALYSIS

Campaign for smoke-free skies has impact

On 8 October 1992 the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), a United Nations affiliated agency consisting of more than 150 nations, approved a resolution which urges member nations to work towards eliminating smoking on international commercial airline flights by 1 July 1996.

The resolution, which was proposed by the Canadian delegate and cosponsored by Australia, was the result of successful tobacco control efforts, largely undertaken by the Campaign for Smoke-Free Skies Worldwide, which was launched in 1991 and headed by Kenneth Kyle (Canadian Cancer Society) and Fran Du Melle (American Lung Association).

Although the resolution is not legally binding and provides for no regulatory authority, it sets a needed and accepted standard for smoke-free airlines worldwide. In its original form, the resolution would have encouraged the airlines of all member countries to implement a complete smoking ban by 1 July 1994. Unfortunately, lobbying by several countries opposed to the ban, including the United Kingdom, Spain, and Germany (and the tobacco industry), resulted in a target date set for implementation by 1 July 1996.

United States Congressman Richard Durbin, a leading sponsor of legislation banning smoking on US domestic flights, has been pushing for international regulations to ban smoking on all international flights since 1991 as a key participant in the Smoke-Free Skies Worldwide Campaign. In response to the ICAO resolution, Durbin stated, "The action sends a strong signal of international support for an international airline smoking ban. Even though it will be up to individual countries to adopt the standard, an ICAO standard provides valuable support to those countries."



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Airlines in some countries, including Canada, Australia, and the United States, have already implemented bans on some international flights. Smoke-free international flights on Cathay Pacific include Australia-Hong Kong, Hong Kong-Vancouver, and Hong Kong-Los Angeles. Qantas and Air New Zealand announced non-smoking flights beginning on 1 October 1992 including flights between Australia and New Zealand and Australia and Los Angeles. Canada plans to implement completely smoke-free flights before the target date set in the ICAO resolution. In April 1988 Northwest Airlines banned smoking on all flights between the United States and Canada, Mexico, Jamaica, and the Cayman Islands.

Thanks to the efforts of the Campaign for Smoke-Free Skies Worldwide, Canada, and Australia, the elimination of smoking on all commercial airline flights as a standard is becoming more of a reality. The efforts of tobacco control advocates and organisations will be required to encourage all countries and airlines to adopt at the very least the ICAO resolution as set for 1996. The res-

olution can also be used in support of proposed legislation which would mandate smoke-free commercial flights before the implementation date set in the resolution. - ES

See p 310. - ED

Ethics of tobacco-funded research in US medical schools

In 1991 Dr Dan Glatt, then a third-year student at New York Medical College (Valhalla, New York), was reviewing a list of the school's researchers and funding sources, when he saw that \$190 000 had been awarded by the Smokeless Tobacco Research Program and \$80 000 by the Council for Tobacco Research, USA, Inc.

Glatt's further investigation revealed that a pathology professor at the medical school had received \$209 000 from Philip Morris for a project entitled "Personality characteristics and the development of atherosclerosis."

Questioning the ethics of a financial association between the tobacco industry and a medical school with close ties to the Catholic church, Glatt privately addressed his concerns to the medical school's president, director of research, and director of public relations. When each defended the acceptance of tobacco industry money, arguing in part that economic times dictate that the source of unrestricted research grants ought not be seriously challenged, Glatt determined to pursue the issue nationally through the American Medical Association Medical Student Section (AMA-MSS).

Although the AMA has stepped up its anti-smoking efforts in recent years through campaigns for the elimination of smoking from hospitals and a resolution calling for a federal ban on tobacco advertising, it had never gone on record as discouraging medical schools from accepting research funding from the tobacco industry.

Glatt's proposed resolution for the AMA to discourage all medical schools from accepting research funds from the tobacco industry and its subsidiaries generated heated debate among the medical student delegates to the AMA's meeting in December 1991.

One student went so far as to say he would accept a scholarship from the tobacco industry even though his father died from lung cancer due to smoking. Glatt pointed out that the resolution would not prohibit the acceptance of research funding from tobacco companies but would merely identify the AMA as opposing the practice—a natural extension of a letter sent several years ago by the executive vice president of the AMA to medical school deans urging them to divest share holdings in tobacco companies.

Glatt's resolution failed. However, he and other students succeeded in getting the staff of the AMA-MSS to send a memorandum to the Liaison Committee on Medical Education (LCME), a powerful council affiliated with the AMA that accredits medical schools. The memo urged that a question addressing the subject of research funding by the tobacco industry be included in the liaison committee's 1992 survey of medical schools. According to a report of the AMA-MSS governing council, no such question was included "due to the sensitivity of the question and the fact that the LCME has no policy on the funding mechanisms for medical schools."

The AMA-MSS staff then developed the following three-question

survey which was sent to all 126 US medical school deans:

- (1) Does your medical school accept research funding from the US tobacco industry and its subsidiaries?
- (2) If your medical school does accept tobacco industry and subsidiary support, what would you estimate is the annual dollar amount received?
- (3) Approximately what percentage of your medical school's research budget is derived from tobacco industry sources?

Ninety-five of the schools completed the survey, a response rate of 75.3%. Fifty-two schools (54.7%) acknowledged accepting research funding from the tobacco industry and its subsidiaries. Thirty-seven of these schools had such funding at the time of the survey. The awards ranged from \$60,000 to \$1.4 million, with a mean of \$204,073. Thirty-three of the schools with current awards indicated that these funds accounted for less than 1% of their medical school research budget. Four schools noted that their school received between 1.5% and 2.0% of their research budget from the tobacco industry.

Given these low percentages, the AMA-MSS governing council concluded that "support for medical research by the tobacco industry does not appear to be a significant problem at this time." However, such funding is clearly objectionable on ethical grounds. It is surprising that the AMA's student section, which has had a long tradition of bringing tough anti-tobacco proposals to the AMA, failed to adopt Glatt's resolution. Other routes are being pursued to put this matter on the AMA's agenda.

— AB

Final note: On 9 December 1992 the AMA House of Delegates adopted a resolution to "strongly discourage all medical schools and their parent universities from accepting research funding from the tobacco industry." The resolution was introduced by the American College of Preventive Medicine and the American Association of Public Health Physicians, and was supported by Dr Glatt, US Surgeon General Antonia Novello, the AMA Medical Student Section, and many others. — ED

Tobacco money buys minorities' political support

In 1990 RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company announced plans to launch a new cigarette brand called Uptown. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania was selected as the test market for a promotional blitz aimed at young urban African-Americans. But before RJ Reynolds could get its marketing off the ground, a local group calling itself the Uptown Coalition was formed by Dr Robert Robinson of the Fox Chase Cancer Center. With help from other health advocacy groups and a blast at RJR by Secretary of Health and Human Services Louis Sullivan, the Uptown Coalition was successful in preventing the test marketing of the brand.

While attention paid to the tobacco industry's targeting of these groups has increased public awareness of the disproportionate health and economic toll taken by tobacco use among minorities, leaders in the African-American, Hispanic, and Asian-American communities have been reluctant to publicly condemn the minority organisations and individuals who are wilfully assisting the tobacco industry.

Because of the efforts of the Uptown Coalition and the activism of such individuals as Mandrake, a community graffittist in Chicago, John Wiley Price, a county commissioner in Dallas, and the Reverend Calvin

Supporting Our Scholars of Tomorrow...Today.



If we are to have scientists, engineers and other professionals for tomorrow, we must start today.

Our nation's future depends on its general natural resource, our young people. And their key to the future is education.

But many students simply can't afford to attend college. Government cutbacks in education support, lower student loans and rising costs have combined to limit access to a college education for many minority students who need financial assistance.

That's why Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation continues to support

educational opportunities with contributions to the United Negro College Fund and directly supports institutions of higher learning that serve minority students. Our commitment to UNCF is only part of Brown & Williamson's, and our employees' grants to education.

We know these future leaders, now studying in colleges and universities across the country, need our help. Given the opportunity, these young people will excel and secure a brighter future for themselves and for all of us.



BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION
Our Continuing Commitment to Community Service

Advertisement in the Houston Defender, 9-192
February 1992

"A Chance"



Every kid deserves one. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company salutes the Gulf Association of the Athletics Congress and Coach Dave Bethany Scholarship Fund for giving deserving students a chance to further their education and develop their athletic skills.

Best wishes for a successful 1st Annual Scholarship Fundraiser.

RJ Reynolds
Tobacco Company

Advertisement in gala celebration programme of the Gulf Association of the Athletics Congress (GAAC) to honour coach Dave Bethany

Butts of Harlem's Abyssinian Baptist Church, the public is being made more aware of the specific targeting of minority populations by tobacco and alcohol companies by means of direct advertising on billboards and in newspapers in minority communities, as well as by the funding of civic and educational organisations. (See figures for examples.) Ironically, it is the tobacco industry itself that most benefits as a result of its philanthropic activities. For doling out large sums to minority groups the industry has gained the support of and respect from minority leaders and has all but stifled editorial opposition to tobacco use and promotion among minorities.

Internal tobacco industry documents, released on 13 August by the health advocacy group DOC (Doctors Ought to Care), showed that Philip Morris gave more than \$17 million to minority, educational, and arts groups in 1991. According to a 24-page Philip Morris document, more than 100 African-American, Hispanic, Asian-American, American Indian, and women's groups received financial support, free cigarettes, and various promotional items and favours from the corporation in 1988. In addition to the amounts of money and the dates that the funding was provided to each group, the document also describes the potential and actual support that Philip Morris received from each group on political issues as a result of providing the funding.

For example, the \$9000 that Philip Morris contributed to the National Black Caucus of State Legislators for their 12th annual conference in 1988

was sufficient for the company to note that it gained assistance from the group in opposing cigarette excise taxes and laws to restrict smoking. The \$10000 contributed to the National Association of Hispanic Journalists for its national conference in 1988 helped nurture the group's opposition to restrictions on tobacco advertising. Several California-based organisations that received monetary gifts from Philip Morris, such as Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, the West Coast Black Publishers Association, the Hispanic Bar Association, and the Asian American Fund are cited as having sided with the tobacco industry in efforts to fight Proposition 99, a state-wide referendum which raised cigarette excise taxes and dedicated the funds to education and research on smoking. Similarly, following a reception and banquet sponsored by Philip Morris, the President of the Asian Business Association was noted as having agreed to "assist with Prop 99 mobilisation."

One hopeful sign was the participation by Nelson Mandela in World No-Tobacco Day 1992. The effort undertaken by the Uptown Coalition was also helpful in spite of the fact that RJ Reynolds began an aggressive campaign for Salem cigarettes ("The Box") in the inner-city, African-American neighbourhoods for which Uptown had been intended.

Clearly more must be done in order to be effective and make an impact in counteracting the tobacco industry's influence-peddling and marketing among minority communities. The US National Cancer Institute's National Black Leadership Initiative on Cancer, a biennial national conference on cancer and minorities co-ordinated by Dr Lovell Jones of MD Anderson Cancer Center, Houston, Texas, and the development of the National Association of African Americans for Positive Imagery by Reverend Jesse Brown in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, may well spark more assertive community-based efforts to counteract tobacco use and promotion among minorities. Derrick Jackson, a columnist for the *Boston Globe*, has provided the call to arms in writing, "I do not want to hear another word about drugs in the black community until African-American institutions stop accepting money from cigarette and liquor companies." — ES, AB

Money talks, buys silence

According to internal documents that were turned over to the health advocacy group DOC (Doctors Ought to Care), in 1989 Philip Morris spent \$579000 in seven southwestern states in the United States to kill major smoking control bills. The world's largest tobacco company spent an additional \$158500 on regional lobbyists to influence members of the US Congress. The state bills would have restricted smoking in public places and worksites, increased cigarette taxes, and limited sales of tobacco to children. Philip Morris used the money for contributions to legislators, payment of trips, parties, lecture fees, sponsorship of legislative dinners and other events, supporting the pet charities of legislators, and support of state political caucuses.

Corporate and Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions of the tobacco conglomerate totalling \$114200 were given to over 100 elected officials and both the Democrat and Republican parties. Money was targeted primarily at the most influential members of the legislature. For example, a Philip Morris lobbyist stated that in Arizona the company would "concentrate on leadership and committee chairs in the Senate," and in Kansas it would "shift attention to the Senate Public Health and Welfare Committee to stop bad bills." According to the documents, Philip Morris could have given more money but did not do so: "We gave about \$11000 in Kansas to legislators. It may not seem like much, but that's the most we could give without sticking out like a sore thumb."

The documents reveal a kind of Philip Morris-generated welfare system, in which the only eligible recipients are elected officials. The company paid for trips to New York for legislators, some of whom also received honoraria. In Kansas, for example, "the program involved informal meetings with legislative participation secured by the payment of honorarium." The 1990 lobbying budget called for \$10000 for two New York City trips and \$15000 for a "buck hunt" for Texas legislators.

Although Americans claim to believe that there is no such thing as a "free lunch," their leaders might not share the same view. In 1989 alone in five states Philip Morris hosted nine legislative dinners and receptions for legislators at a cost of more than \$30000. In Arizona Philip Morris spent \$13000 to sponsor a reception

for the legislators' opening session. The cigarette maker also gave over 600 free tickets to elected officials for 17 Philip Morris-sponsored programmes including Marlboro music concerts, Virginia Slims tennis tournaments, and Marlboro auto racing events. Because Philip Morris and other tobacco companies are able to deduct from taxes most advertising, promotional, and lobbying activities as business expenses it is the average American taxpayer who foots much of the bill for these shenanigans.

Money was also channelled into the favourite non-profit charities of key legislators (\$61 700) as well as to regional and state political associations, including \$5000 to the Texas Speaker's Day and \$5000 to the Texas Voters Registration. Aside from political caucuses, the company poured money into charitable groups in exchange for support of their legislative efforts. Referring to Louisiana charitable groups, a Philip Morris lobbyist wrote, "we give where there is political benefit." As for the political groups in Louisiana, the lobbyist continued, "We gave money last year to every caucus that ever existed and will continue to do so."

Another strategy is to employ "grass-tops," who are friends of key members of the US Congress. Philip Morris employed eight such people in the southwestern region in 1989 who, according to Federal Lobby Reports, were paid an additional \$158 500 to influence key members of Congress. For example, one "grass-top" was paid \$36 000 by Philip Morris to influence US Senator Robert Dole, a perennial Republican presidential candidate and former Republican vice presidential running mate of Gerald Ford in 1976. According to the US Federal Election Commission, Senator Dole has received \$47 400 from tobacco companies since 1985, placing him among the top 15 recipients of tobacco money. The \$47 000, however, does not include the \$18 500 that Philip Morris contributed in 1991 to the Dole Foundation, a non-profit organisation founded by the senator (a disabled war veteran) to provide job training and placement services for people with disabilities. Another "grass-top" was paid \$36 000 in 1989, and according to the internal documents was "OK for one or two votes" for Texas senators.

In 1990 Philip Morris went on the offensive to pass "smokers' rights" laws which would prevent an employer from discriminating against smokers in hiring practices (Louisiana, Arizona, Missouri, New Mexico, and Oklahoma are among 27 states to

have passed such laws). According to the internal documents, the company's strategy was coordinated with RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company and the Tobacco Institute.

Because of weak laws on lobbying and political campaign finances, only a small portion of this money is actually reported in each state. For example, in Missouri Philip Morris internal documents report \$20 000 in Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions to key legislators in 1989, yet a report from the Secretary of State office indicates only \$3500 were reported. A large proportion of PAC funds was funnelled through the state Democratic (\$67 000) and Republican (\$47 000) parties, where it would be harder to detect but an easy way to buy favour from party leaders.

DOC has called on the attorneys general in the seven southwestern states to investigate whether or not these activities were legal. Regrettably, state attorneys general may also take money from the tobacco industry for their political campaigns. There is no question that the lobbying system in many states, and at the federal level, must be reviewed and changed. The issue goes far beyond the huge sums of money that tobacco companies have at their disposal for political purposes.

The internal tobacco company documents have helped verify a number of assumptions made by tobacco control advocates about tobacco politics. Philip Morris used its money to buy political support, to defeat public health legislation, and to advance what can only be described as a cancer-causing agenda.

As US tobacco companies continue to find new markets abroad, one might assume that similar political strategies will be used. In a recent conversation with Dr Zdenek Kucera, Director for the National Center for Health Promotion in Prague, Dr Kucera commented, "In Czechoslovakia Philip Morris and other tobacco companies can afford to buy support from every member of both parties, and we're still learning what freedom we are permitted through our new government to call attention to political issues like this." — ES, AB

Did tobacco trade journal mean to say tobacco advertising buys journalistic silence?

A whining report in the trade journal *Tobacco International* on events in Australia over the past two years¹ not only reveals an unusual sense of powerlessness on the part of the tobacco industry following numerous setbacks in the courts and in state and federal parliaments, but also admits that the willingness of the mass media to address tobacco issues was heretofore dampened by the presence of tobacco advertisers.

Although it has long been surmised by a few students of the tobacco industry that an important — and perhaps the most important — purpose of cigarette advertising is to foster the silence of mass media corporations, seldom does a tobacco trade journalist let slip with a rationale for the age-old reticence of publishers and broadcasters to seriously address — much less, support — efforts to curtail smoking and its promotion:

Provocation by the anti-smoking lobby reached new heights after a judge of the federal court established that he "was in no doubt that passive smoking had profound effects upon the health of non-smokers." Currently, the judgment is the subject of appeal to a higher jurisdiction.

Fuelled by the judgment, the anti-smoking campaign throughout Australia reached unprecedented heights and received unlimited support from the electronic and print media, both of which, now barred by the federal government from publishing tobacco product advertising, have no need to consider or appease the feelings of an advertiser.

The Sydney-based reporter, Ellis Glover, also acknowledged that "there has been a down-turn in consumer demand [for cigarettes] related to the restrictions on advertising and promotion, anti-smoking propaganda, and escalating prices as a result of increases in taxes at the retail level." — AB

¹ Glover E. Australia report: more than a little disappointing. *Tobacco International* 1992; 194 (17): 24-30. (1 October issue.)

Shared accommodation – non-smokers wanted!

An interesting barometer of the anti-smoking mood of a community can be found in the advertising pages for shared accommodation in newspapers. The table shows a breakdown of the descriptors for potential co-tenants used by advertisers in Australia's *Sydney Morning Herald* edition of Saturday 29 August 1992. There were 589 advertisements altogether listed under "share accommodation." Of these, 254 gave no specifications about the sort of person the advertisers were seeking – that is, they just described the house, rent, facilities, view, etc. There were thus 335 advertisements which described in any way the sort of person with whom advertisers were prepared to share

Qualities sought by advertisers for "share accommodation," Sydney, 29 August 1992

	Non-smoker	Male or female specified	Age range stated	Personality*	Professional occupation	Gay	Other**
No %	142 42.3	133 39.7	68 20.3	63 18.8	43 12.8	20 6.0	35 10.4

* Friendly, happy, easygoing, fun, good natured, amiable, tidy, neat, responsible, sensible, reliable, civilised, quiet, creative.

** Tolerant of animals (11), racial type specified (9), smoker (5), vegetarian (3), Christian (3), employed (4).

their houses or apartments.

The most common specification listed, even beyond requiring a particular sex, was non-smoking. Non-smokers were more than twice in demand as any given age group, and 28 times more in demand than smokers. I have noticed that personal

(partner sought, lonely heart) advertisements also commonly specify that non-smoking is a high priority. We would be interested to learn of any other "unobtrusive" measures of the gains made by tobacco control in different communities. – SC

A delicious hoax

Dr Paula Scariati of Loma Linda, California, reports that the tobacco industry was surprisingly and dismayingly well represented at the fifth national conference on nicotine dependence, presented by the American Society of Addiction Medicine on 17–19 September 1992 in Seattle, Washington.

In the midst of pharmaceutical company promotional exhibits for nicotine transdermal systems and tables stacked high with pamphlets from the American Lung Association and other health groups was a display of various brands of cigarettes and food products manufactured by newly acquired subsidiaries of tobacco companies. A pleasant woman at the booth offered free samples of the foods to conference participants, many of whom spoke cheerfully with her.

During one of the conference's question-and-answer sessions, one

outraged attendee, Dr John Slade, demanded to know why the tobacco industry had been allowed to rent exhibition space at the meeting. The woman herself came to the podium to respond. After thanking the participants for their courtesy to her and their interest in trying her industry's products, she introduced herself as a member of Washington DOC (Doctors Ought to Care), a regional branch of the health activist group. She then chided the many members of the audience for having reciprocated her friendliness, reminding them that one of the most successful strategies of tobacco companies is to create a wholesome, familiar, family-oriented image for its non-tobacco products. In fact, in recent years tobacco industry hostesses, not unlike this woman from DOC, have been stationed at conferences of health organisations. For instance, exhibi-

tion booths for RJ Reynolds' Fleischmanns margarine and Philip Morris' Louis Rich turkey products and Sanka coffee have regularly appeared at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Family Physicians. A plan by the American Heart Association to sell its logotype for endorsement purposes to food companies was abandoned following protests by health professionals, aghast in general over such base commercialism and in particular over the fact that tobacco company food subsidiaries were to have carried the association's endorsement.

Washington DOC's ultimate message for health professionals is not to be fooled by tobacco company representatives in other guises, for these are the same people who earn their bread and butter by recruiting thousands of new adolescent smokers each day. – AB